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Introduction
Climate justice litigation in the United States is in transition. It traces its 
origins to the environmental justice movement that began in the late 1980s.1 
The environmental justice movement was grounded in a growing awareness of 
the linkage between environmental and human rights problems and the need 
for law and policy responses to address the disproportionate impacts of envi-
1. Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner & Randall S. Abate, International and Domestic Law Dimensions of 
Climate Justice for Arctic Indigenous Peoples, 43 Ottawa L. J. 113, 121 (2013). For a helpful discus-
sion of the legal and historical foundations of the environmental justice movement in the United 
States, see generally Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., The Law of Environmental 
Justice: Theories and Procedures to Address Disproportionate Risks (2d ed. 2009); Robert 
D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (3d ed. 2000); Luke 
W. Cole & Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of 
the Environmental Justice Movement (2000).
* The author gratefully acknowledges valuable research assistance from Mackenzie Landa, 
Esq. 
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ronmental problems on minority and low-income communities throughout 
the United States.2 The implementation of environmental justice measures 
at the federal3 and state4 levels since the 1990s helped provide a foundation 
for climate justice litigation in the United States. Climate justice litigation in 
the United States also has drawn some of its inspiration from developments 
at the international level, where the connection between climate change and 
human rights became galvanized in response to the Inuit petition before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 2005.5 Climate jus-
tice litigation seeks to provide remedies to marginalized communities that 
are facing climate change impacts and that lack financial and technological 
resources to effectively adapt to these changes.6 
The U.S. climate justice movement began with public nuisance lawsuits 
that sought injunctive relief or damages for climate change impacts.7 Paral-
leling the evolution of the public nuisance line of climate justice lawsuits was 
the landmark case of Massachusetts v. EPA.8 Massachusetts and several other 
states sued to compel the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
fulfill its duty to regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) as a pollutant under the 
Clean Air Act. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the states had stand-
ing to bring the suit and that EPA had authority to regulate CO2 as a pol-
2. The environmental justice movement initially focused on “environmental racism” as manifested by the 
disproportionate siting of environmentally undesirable land uses in African American communities. The 
movement subsequently broadened its focus from environmental racism to “environmental justice,” 
which expanded the movement’s reach to include other disadvantaged communities, including low-
income communities and Native American communities. See David H. Getches & David N. Pellow, 
Beyond “Traditional” Environmental Justice, in Justice and Resources: Concepts, Strategies, and 
Applications 5–6, 24–25 (Katherine M. Mutz, Gary C. Bryner & Douglas S. Kenney eds., 2002).
3. See, e.g., Office of Environmental Justice, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Plan 
EJ 2014 (2011), http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100DFCQ.PDF?Dockey=P100DFCQ.PDF 
(providing a roadmap for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to integrate environmental 
justice considerations into all of its programs); Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in 
Minority Populations and Low-income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 
(Feb. 16, 1994) (directing federal agencies to incorporate environmental justice considerations into 
their decisionmaking processes).
4. See generally University of California Hastings College of the Law Public Law Research 
Institute, Environmental Justice for All: A Fifty State Survey of Legislation, Policies, and 
Cases (4th ed. 2010), http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/ejreport-fourthedition.pdf.
5. See generally Hari M. Osofsky, Complexities of Addressing the Impacts of Climate Change on Indigenous 
Peoples through International Law Petitions: A Case Study of the Inuit Petition to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, in Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: The Search for 
Legal Remedies (Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner eds., 2013).
6. For a valuable and comprehensive discussion of the foundations and evolution of climate justice 
litigation, see generally International Bar Association, Achieving Justice and Human Rights 
in an Era of Climate Disruption (2014), http://www.ibanet.org/PresidentialTaskForceClimate
ChangeJustice2014Report.aspx.
7. See infra Part I.
8. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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lutant under the Act.9 This successful effort helped launch climate justice 
as a field in the United States because the case was not merely a citizen suit 
enforcement action under the Clean Air Act; it was a creative use of the 
courts to seek injunctive relief for climate change impacts in Massachusetts 
and elsewhere in response to Congress’ and the executive branch’s failure to 
regulate climate change. 
Now in its “third wave” in the form of atmospheric trust litigation 
(ATL), climate justice litigation seeks to merge aspects of the public nui-
sance line of cases and the Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency 
litigation theories. First, like Massachusetts v. EPA, ATL targets the most 
appropriate defendant—governmental entities—rather than singling out 
entities in the private sector as in the public nuisance line of cases. Second, 
like the public nuisance cases, ATL embraces a common law doctrine with 
a track record of success in environmental litigation—in this instance, the 
public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine is even better suited than 
public nuisance for climate justice litigation because it has already evolved 
and broadened the focus of its applicability to issues beyond the initial 
tethering of the theory to the “traditional triad” of public trust uses (i.e., 
navigation, commerce, and fishing).10 The extension of the public trust 
doctrine’s applicability to atmospheric resources is a logical next step to 
include within the government’s environmental stewardship responsibili-
ties under the doctrine.
This chapter addresses the evolution of ATL from its public trust doctrine 
roots and the value of ATL as a tool to promote climate justice. Part I of this 
chapter examines the climate justice movement in the United States and 
describes the evolution of the public nuisance line of cases that launched this 
field. Part II describes the evolution of the public trust doctrine and how it 
serves as the conceptual foundation for ATL. Part III discusses how the ulti-
mate goal of ATL—to apply this state law theory at the federal level11—faced 
a serious roadblock in Alec L. v. McCarthy.12 Although this decision may have 
dimmed hopes for the applicability of ATL at the federal level, the success 
of recent ATL cases at the federal and state levels, and in foreign domestic 
courts, underscores how ATL will be a valuable tool to promote climate jus-
tice in the United States and abroad in the years ahead.
9. Id. at 516–26. 
10. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
11. For a valuable discussion of the parameters of ATL from the scholar who conceived this theory, and 
its ultimate goal of applicability to the federal government, see generally Mary Christina Wood, Atmo-
spheric Trust Litigation, in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and International 
Approaches (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
12. Alec L. v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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I. The Climate Justice Movement in the United States
Climate justice litigation in the United States would not have evolved as 
quickly as it did without building on the foundation from the environmental 
justice movement. Environmental regulation in the 1970s and 1980s was 
extremely effective in managing pollution of environmental resources such 
as air, water, land, and endangered species. Despite the success of federal 
environmental statutes enacted to protect these resources, and litigation to 
enforce the mandates of these statutes, a growing awareness emerged in the 
1980s and 1990s that this environmental management scheme was missing 
an important component of the ecosystem: humans. The impacts of envi-
ronmental problems are not limited to the impairment of the environmen-
tal resources—there are also serious human dimensions to environmental 
problems.
The environmental justice movement in the United States evolved to draw 
attention to the human dimensions of environmental problems by under-
scoring how minority and low-income communities are disproportionately 
burdened by these environmental problems. Environmental justice regula-
tion consists largely of procedural mechanisms at the federal and state levels 
designed to consider and seek to mitigate the adverse environmental impacts 
of agency decisionmaking on affected communities.13 This new area of law 
represented an important shift in thinking that helped climate justice litiga-
tion follow as a logical next step in the effort to provide protection to com-
munities that are marginalized by environmental problems.
Building on the foundation of the environmental justice movement, cli-
mate justice litigation developed primarily as a response to the failure of the 
U.S. government to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in a compre-
hensive manner at the federal level. The United States was not a Party to 
the Kyoto Protocol and did not implement Kyoto-like legislation to regulate 
climate change in the past two decades. The ultimate goal of climate jus-
tice litigation, therefore, was to apply pressure to the federal government to 
implement a regulatory framework to address this problem and to impose 
liability on significant emitters of GHGs in the private sector for their con-
tributions to the climate change problem. Climate justice litigation against 
13. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 4. Federal courts have rejected litigants’ efforts to establish a substantive remedy 
for disparate impacts of environmental problems on minority and low-income communities. See, e.g., 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
does not authorize a private right of action in lawsuits alleging evidence of disparate impact); South 
Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding 
that Title VI does not authorize a private right of action under EPA’s disparate impact regulations in 
the absence of evidence of intentional discrimination).
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private sector entities seeking remedies for certain communities that were 
disproportionately burdened by the impacts of climate change followed 
shortly thereafter.
Public nuisance suits served as the foundation for climate justice litigation. 
These cases build on the foundation of the “federal common law of interstate 
pollution,” which is a narrow doctrine established in air14 and water15 pollu-
tion cases. Climate change impacts are a form of interstate pollution, which 
triggered the potential applicability of this doctrine.
The first in this line of public nuisance cases was American Electric Power 
(AEP) v. Connecticut,16 in which Connecticut and other states sought to 
integrate a public nuisance action and the federal common law of interstate 
pollution to obtain injunctive relief against several power plants for their 
significant collective contribution to climate change. The plaintiff sought 
injunctive relief against the power companies in requesting that the court 
issue an order to the companies to reduce their GHG emissions by a certain 
percentage. The U.S. Supreme Court in AEP ultimately concluded that this 
suit was barred on federal displacement grounds.17 
The second step in this line of cases involved a shift in litigation strategy. 
Seeking injunctive relief for climate change issues raised concerns under the 
political question doctrine as to whether the courts were the proper forum 
to seek relief for climate change issues because such issues arguably need to 
be addressed first by either the executive or legislative branches. Therefore, 
in California v. General Motors Corp.,18 the state of California sued major 
automakers for these companies’ alleged contribution to the public nuisance 
of global warming and sought damages for the impacts from the current and 
future harms from global warming. The state voluntarily withdrew its claim, 
but the case laid an important foundation for future climate justice cases that 
sought damages under the public nuisance theory. 
The litigation theory then adjusted slightly again in the next phase of the 
evolution of this theory, which involved public nuisance cases that affected 
14. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (holding that a state that is affected by 
air pollution from a neighboring state can seek injunctive relief from an emissions source in the 
neighboring state that caused the pollution problem).
15. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (holding that federal district courts have 
jurisdiction over interstate water pollution disputes that create a public nuisance, even though the 
federal Clean Water Act was already in place to regulate water pollution issues, and that application 
of federal common law was consistent with the federal Clean Water Act).
16. American Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
17. Federal displacement means that these public nuisance claims based on the federal common law of 
interstate pollution are nonjusticiable because such federal common law claims are barred when a 
federal statute—in this case, the Clean Air Act—addresses the subject matter at issue.
18. California v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 272681 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
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communities (rather than states) filed against private sector entities, includ-
ing oil, gas, and chemical companies. The key lawsuits in this phase of the 
evolution were Comer v. Murphy Oil USA19 and Native Village of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp.20 Seeking damages in these cases represented the essence 
of climate justice litigation under the public nuisance doctrine—affected 
communities that alleged that they had been disproportionately burdened by 
climate change impacts and that sought relief from private sector entities that 
contributed a significant percentage of GHG emissions to the global climate 
change problem. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit embraced the federal dis-
placement reasoning from the AEP case in dismissing the Native Village of 
Kivalina’s claim.21 The U.S. Supreme Court declined review of the Comer 
and Kivalina cases, thereby severely limiting the future of public nuisance 
cases for climate change impacts based on federal common law. Such cases 
may still be filed if based on a state’s common law doctrine of public nui-
sance, however.22
II. The Evolution From the Public Trust Doctrine to 
Atmospheric Trust Litigation (ATL)
The public trust doctrine refers to the government’s obligation to protect and 
maintain certain natural resources for the benefit of its citizens.23 The prin-
ciple originated in ancient Rome and was codified in the Institutes of Justinian 
in the sixth century A.D.24 The ancient Romans acknowledged “public rights 
in water and the seashore which were unrestricted and common to all . . . .”25 
19. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (plaintiffs were victims of Hurricane Katrina 
who alleged that climate change contributed to the increased intensity of the storm that caused them 
to be displaced from their homes in New Orleans, Louisiana).
20. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 2390 (2013) (plaintiffs were a village of approximately 400 Native Alaskans who alleged that 
climate change caused coastal erosion that made their community uninhabitable and would require 
relocation to avoid losing their community due to sea-level rise).
21. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 897. For a discussion of the evolution of public nuisance suits seeking relief for 
climate change impacts, see generally Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice 
Movement: The Right Thing and the Right Time, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 197 (2010).
22. Tracy D. Hester, A New Front Blowing in: State Law and the Future of Climate Change Public Nuisance 
Litigation, 31 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 49, 52 (2012) (citing American Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. 
Ct. 2527 (2011)).
23. Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 Wake Forest J.L. & Pol’y 
281, 283 (2014).
24. Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, The Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust 
Resources: Courts, Trustees, and Political Power in Wisconsin, 27 Ecology L.Q. 135, 140 n.4 (2004).
25. Id. at 140 n.4. See also Helen Althaus, Public Trust Rights 23 (1978) (“By the law of nature these 
things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the 
sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he respects habitations, 
monuments, and buildings . . .”).
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Under English common law, the concept developed into the idea of a public 
trust, pursuant to which title to navigable waters and “the bed or soil beneath 
tidal waters” was vested in the British Crown so that the Crown may “control 
the highways of commerce and navigation for the advantage of the public . . 
. .”26 Thus, the British Crown acts as trustee to the citizens of Great Britain 
over the tidal waters and the submerged grounds beneath.27 These natural 
resources are “not held in fee simple, but rather . . . in trust for the people and 
only for purposes that benefit the public interest.”28
Following the American Revolution, the properties held in trust by the 
British Crown within the American colonies shifted to the now-former colo-
nies as newly sovereign states.29 Thus, the United States’ doctrine initially 
recognized that the tidelands, and the lands beneath tidal and navigable 
waterways, should be held in trust by the states for the public to promote 
the interests of the public.30 According to early public trust judicial opinions, 
those public interests were to promote navigation, commerce, and fishing.31 
The doctrine itself is a function of sovereignty that “imposes duties on gov-
ernment[,] instills certain inalienable rights in the people[,] and . . . con-
stitutes the sovereign legal obligation that facilitates the reproduction and 
survival of our society . . . .”32 
Legal scholars have identified language in the U.S. Constitution to illus-
trate the vital importance of the public trust concept in American law.33 For 
example, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses reflect the framers’ 
intentions to protect and reserve certain ideals and rights for future genera-
tions.34 According to Prof. Gerald Torres, the public trust is the slate upon 
26. Id. at 140.
27. Id.
28. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 23, at 287.
29. Scanlan, supra note 24, at 140. See also Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (recog-
nizing that “[w]hen the Revolution took place the people of each State became themselves sovereign, 
and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them, 
for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the 
general government.”).
30. Barton H. Thompson Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction & Defense, 15 
Southeastern Envtl. L.J. 47, 67–68 (2006). 
31. Id. at 68. These three uses came to be known as the “traditional triad” of public trust uses.
32. Id. at 289. 
33. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 23, at 293–94. 
34. Torres & Bellinger state: 
The Equal Protection Clause is designed to ensure that all persons are treated equally before 
the law. Temporal inequality requires a judicial mechanism to ensure the protection of future 
generations. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment incorporates unenumerated 
rights against the federal government. Whether a particular unenumerated right or limita-
tion qualifies depends on “whether the right . . . is fundamental to our scheme of ordered 
liberty . . . or . . . whether this right is ‘deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition.’” 
 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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which “all constitutions and laws are written.”35 Prof. Mary Christina Wood 
characterizes the public trust as having a constitutional force based on “the 
inherent and inalienable rights of citizens as reserved through their social 
contract with government . . . .”36 Notwithstanding these compelling theo-
ries from leading scholars, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the public 
trust doctrine is a state law doctrine.37 While many state constitutions incor-
porate elements of the public trust doctrine, most state courts find justifica-
tion for the doctrine in the common law,38 whereas some have found it to 
be a hybrid “of customary law but essentially constitutional in character.”39
Early American jurisprudence only recognized navigable waterways, the 
lands beneath navigable waterways, and the seashore between high and low 
tides as public trust assets.40 Carson v. Blazer, decided in 1810, was the first 
significant case to raise the public trust issue in the United States.41 In an 
attempt to create a private fishery along the Susquehanna River, a riparian 
landowner claimed that his properties extended through the center of the 
river.42 The Pennsylvania court held that “a riparian owner enjoys ‘no exclu-
sive right to fish in the river immediately in front of his lands . . . the right 
to fisheries in that river is vested in the state, and open to all . . . .’”43 Sub-
sequently, in 1821, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that lands below a 
beach’s low water mark belong to the public and, therefore, the shellfish beds 
below the low mark could not be privately owned.44 The most famous U.S. 
public trust case, Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, was decided in 1892.45 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Illinois legislature’s allocation of more 
than 1,000 acres of submerged lands in Lake Michigan, and along the Chi-
cago waterfront, to a private railroad company was beyond the scope of the 
35. Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: Environmental Law for a New Ecological Age 129 
(2013) (quoting Gerald Torres, Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, Keynote Address at the University of 
Oregon School of Law (Feb. 23, 2012)).
36. Mary Christina Wood, The Planet on the Docket: Atmospheric Trust Litigation to Protect Earth’s Climate 
System and Habitability, 9 Fla. A&M L. Rev. 259, 261 (2014).
37. Thompson, supra note 30, at 57. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 482 
(1988) (relying on Mississippi law to determine the extent of public trust lands); Appleby v. City of 
New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (relying on New York common law to determine whether a 
private owner could restrain the city of New York from dredging the land and using the water).
38. S.C. Const. art. XIV, §4 (“All navigable waters shall forever remain public highways free to the citizens 
of the State.”). See also Pa. Const. art. IX, §27; Tex. Const. art. XVI, §59; Haw. Const. art. I, §2 
& art. XI, §1. 
39. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 16–17 (N.J. 1821); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Mich. 
2005); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 425 (Haw. 2000).
40. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 23, at 286.
41. Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810).
42. Id. at 486.
43. Id. at 495.
44. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 52.
45. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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legislature’s authority because the property was held in trust for the public 
by the state.46
As society’s perceptions of public resources have evolved, so too has the 
scope of resources protected by the public trust doctrine.47 For example, 
though the commercial importance of waterways and the reliance on private 
fishing as a food source have declined, tidal areas and navigable waterways 
are still valuable public resources.48 Coastal populations have increased, as 
have the recreational values of coastlines to those populations.49 As a result, 
many state courts now safeguard natural resources for “general recreation, 
environmental protection, and aesthetics.”50 For example, in Gould v. Grey-
lock Reservation Commission in 1966, citizens sued as public trust beneficia-
ries to prevent enforcement of a statute privatizing a large portion of a nature 
reserve for a ski resort.51 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the 
statute was invalid and enjoined the state from granting public lands for a 
private use.52 In 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court expanded the public 
trust doctrine to dry sand areas of the beach when it ruled that the public 
had a right to “cross and make reasonable use” of a privately owned, dry sand 
area of the beach when it “is essential or reasonably necessary for enjoyment 
of the ocean.”53
In addition, scientific advances have raised climate change and envi-
ronmental concerns that have augmented the ecological significance that 
society places on coastal areas, shorelines, and water resources.54 As a 
result, some states now recognize non-navigable tributaries, wetlands, and 
groundwater as protected assets.55 In 1971, the California Supreme Court 
recognized that the public trust is a flexible doctrine capable of adapting 
to changing public needs.56 In Marks v. Whitney, the court prevented a 
property owner from developing tidelands because preservation of those 
46. Id. at 456. 
47. Thompson, supra note 30, at 67.
48. Id. at 67–68.
49. Id. at 68.
50. Id. at 70 n.12. Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of Coastal Beaches), 649 A.2d 604, 609 (N.H. 
1994) (recognizing recreation as one of the purposes of the public trust doctrine); Borough of Nep-
tune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) (finding that public rights 
extend to “recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities”). Not all courts, 
however, have been willing to expand the public trust purposes. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 
A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1989) (limiting trust rights to fishing, fowling, and navigation); Opinion of the 
Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (limiting trust rights to fishing and navigation). 
51. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966). 
52. Id. at 126.
53. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365–66 (N.J. 1984).
54. Thompson, supra note 30, at 53.
55. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 23, at 297.
56. Thompson, supra note 30, at 52.
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tidelands “in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units 
for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food 
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scen-
ery and climate of the area” is an important objective for the public trust 
doctrine.57 
The above cases underscore the public trust doctrine’s role as “a legal 
framework that citizens can use to compel government to fulfill its fidu-
ciary duties to protect natural resources.”58 In response to global climate 
change, a movement to extend the public trust doctrine to include the 
earth’s atmosphere has led to ATL.59 ATL proponents perceive the earth’s 
atmosphere “as a single public trust asset in its entirety” over which all 
sovereigns are co-trustees with mutual responsibilities.60 ATL attempts to 
impose a legal duty on governments to protect the atmosphere, and seeks 
to require governments to execute that duty based on scientific data and 
implement a policy of shared responsibility with regard to reducing CO2 
emissions.61 
ATL pioneer and scholar, Professor Wood, sees ATL as a logical extension 
of the Illinois Central opinion. The Illinois Central Court announced that 
“the state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
people are interested . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the admin-
istration of government . . . .”62 Nevertheless, courts have been reluctant to 
extend the public trust doctrine to include the atmosphere. ATL has had 
limited success at the state level to date; however, some recent developments 
appear promising.63 An ATL case has not yet succeeded at the federal level. 
The Alec L. v. McCarthy case discussed in Part III presented the opportunity 
that ATL needed to apply the theory at the federal level, but the case was 
dismissed. 
57. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (concluding that the “public uses to which tidelands 
are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs,” including environmental 
preservation).
58. Torres & Bellinger, supra note 23, at 316–17. But see Patrick Redmond, The Public Trust in Wildlife: 
Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back, 49 Nat. Resources J. 249 (2009) (arguing that the public trust 
doctrine has expanded in an inconsistent and controversial manner that does not support application 
to wildlife protection efforts).
59. See generally Wood, supra note 36 (discussing the need for and viability of atmospheric trust litigation); 
see also Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common Law 
Public Trust Doctrines, 34 Vt. L. Rev. 781 (2010) (arguing that the public trust doctrine can provide 
a legal mechanism for states to implement management-based climate change adaptation regimes).
60. Wood, supra note 36, at 270.
61. Id. at 271.
62. Id. at 261 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)).
63. See infra Part III.B. for a discussion of ATL state cases.
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III. Moving Forward With ATL in the Wake of Alec L. v. 
McCarthy
After reviewing the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Alec L. v. McCarthy, and the 
subsequent pending federal ATL case in Juliana, Part III discusses how ATL 
and ATL-related cases at the state level in the United States and in foreign 
countries offer some hope for the continued viability of the ATL theory as a 
tool to secure climate justice in the courts.
A.  The Federal Avenue for ATL
In Alec L. v. Jackson,64 the plaintiffs—five youths65 and two nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs)66—filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia against Lisa Jackson, then-administrator of EPA, and 
other federal officials. The complaint alleged that each of the defendants, as 
agencies and officers of the federal government, “have wasted and failed to 
preserve and protect the atmosphere Public Trust asset.”67
The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue in federal 
court. The court determined that the key question is “whether Plaintiffs’ 
public trust claim is a creature of state or federal common law.”68 The plain-
tiffs argued that the public trust doctrine presents a federal question because 
it “is not in any way exclusively a state law doctrine.”69 The court rejected this 
argument, relying on a 2012 Supreme Court decision70 that stated that “the 
public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law” and its “contours . . . do 
not depend upon the Constitution.”71 
The parties disagreed as to whether the Supreme Court’s declaration 
regarding the public trust doctrine is part of the holding or merely dic-
ta.72 The court determined that this concern is a non-issue because even 
carefully considered language in dicta generally must be regarded as 
authoritative.73 The district court noted that even if the Supreme Court’s 
64. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012).
65. The five youth plaintiffs were Alec L., Madeleine W., Garret & Grant S., and Zoe J.
66. The two NGO plaintiffs were Kids vs. Global Warming and WildEarth Guardians. According to Our 
Children’s Trust (OCT), these plaintiffs partnered with OCT to file the lawsuit.
67. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
68. Id. at 15. 
69. Id.
70. PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 
116–22 and accompanying text.
71. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 15.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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declaration were not binding, the court would at least regard the declara-
tion as persuasive.74 
The court also considered the argument of a federal common law public 
trust doctrine. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in AEP, the court 
concluded that even if the public trust doctrine had been a federal common 
law claim at one time, it has subsequently been displaced by federal regula-
tion, specifically the Clean Air Act.75 In holding that the federal common 
law cause of action was displaced by the Clean Air Act, the court concluded 
that federal judges may not set limits on GHG emissions “in the face of a 
law empowering EPA to set the same limits, subject to judicial review only to 
ensure against action arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law.”76 
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit in Alec L. v. 
McCarthy.77 In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the D.C. 
Circuit concluded in a two-page opinion that: (1) the plaintiffs failed to rely 
on any cases that indicate that violations of the public trust doctrine may 
apply as a federal question, and (2) the Supreme Court had recently reaf-
firmed that “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.”78 
B.  ATL State Law Actions Remain Viable and Important
Despite the setback in the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Alec L. v. McCarthy, 
several ATL cases are pending as of this writing in state courts throughout 
the United States.79 Some type of climate change-related case has been filed 
in all 50 states, most of which have been administrative petitions that have 
realized limited success to date.80 Several actions have received favorable rul-
ings. For example, in Bonser-Lain v. Texas,81 the Texas Environmental Law 
Center sued the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), 
seeking judicial review of TCEQ’s denial of a petition for rulemaking. While 
the court ultimately determined that the decision was a “reasonable exercise” 
74. Id.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id. at 17.
77. Alec L. v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. App’x 7 (2014). 
78. Id. at 8.
79. See OCT, State Legal Actions (listing pending and past claims), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/Legal (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2016). OCT is an NGO based in Eugene, Oregon, that has undertaken impressive 
and inspiring work in advancing ATL in the United States and abroad.
80. Id. (reporting that the 39 petitions for rulemaking that have been submitted to administrative agencies 
have been denied). 
81. Bonser-Lain v. Texas Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 2, 
2012), http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/thester/courses/Climate-Change-2012/BonserLain%20v%20
TCEQ.pdf.
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of the agency’s discretion, the court’s opinion was supportive of the use of 
the public trust doctrine for protection of air and atmosphere.82 The Texas 
district court invalidated the TCEQ’s determination that the public trust 
doctrine applied only to water, stating “the public trust doctrine includes 
all natural resources of the State including the air and atmosphere.”83 The 
court further held that the federal Clean Air Act is a “floor, not a ceiling, for 
the protection of air quality,” effectively rejecting the defendant’s argument 
that the issue was preempted by the Clean Air Act.84 This reasoning provides 
an important distinction from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in AEP in 
which the Court held that the plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim was displaced 
by the Clean Air Act. 
Five days after the Texas court decision in July 2012, a district court in 
New Mexico denied the state’s motion to dismiss an ATL lawsuit. In Sand-
ers-Reed v. Martinez,85 the New Mexico governor’s office was sued for failure 
to protect the atmospheric trust from the effects of climate change.86 The 
district court denied the state’s motion to dismiss and allowed the case to 
proceed to the merits.87 Although the court granted the state’s motion for 
summary judgment, this case is important because it is the first ATL case to 
proceed to the merits. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision on procedural grounds; however, the court noted that 
the New Mexico Constitution supports the conclusion that the state’s public 
trust encompasses the atmosphere.88 
Progress on ATL at the state level suffered a setback in 2015 in Oregon. 
In Chernaik v. Brown, the plaintiffs alleged that their personal and economic 
well-being are “dependent upon the health of the state’s natural resources 
held in trust for the benefit of its citizens, including water resources, sub-
82. Id. at 2.
83. Id. at 1.
84. Id.
85. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 42 ELR 20159, No. D-101-CV-2011-01514 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 14, 
2012).
86. See OCT, New Mexico, http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/new-mexico (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
87. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 42 ELR 20159, No. D-101-CV-2011-01514 (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 14, 
2012), order issued (N.M. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2012).
88. See Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015). Additional support for ATL 
can be found in the concurring opinion in an Iowa Court of Appeals case, Filippone ex rel. Filippone 
v. Iowa Dep’t of Natural Resources, 829 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013). In this case, the plaintiff 
petitioned the Iowa Department of Natural Resources to adopt new rules regarding the emission of 
GHGs. Although the court declined to expand the public trust doctrine to include the atmosphere, 
Judge Doyle’s concurring opinion noted that “there is a sound public policy basis” to extend the 
public trust doctrine to include the atmosphere. Later in 2013, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the 
dismissal of the case. See Press Release, Our Children’s Trust et al., Iowa Supreme Court Declines 
to Review Climate Case, (May 10, 2013), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/13.05.09-
IowaSC-Decision_0.pdf.
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merged and submersible lands, coastal lands, forests, and wildlife,” all of 
which are threatened by climate change.89 The plaintiffs contended that they 
will be “adversely and irreparable injured” by defendants’ failure to limit 
GHG emissions.90 The plaintiffs sought: (1) a declaration that the atmo-
sphere, waters, shores, coastal areas, and wildlife are declared trust resources, 
that Oregon has an obligation to protect them, and that Oregon has failed 
in this obligation; (2) an order that Oregon develop an accurate accounting 
of its current GHG emissions and a plan to reduce those emissions that will 
protect public trust assets; and (3) a declaration that requires “carbon dioxide 
emissions to peak in 2012 and to be reduced by six percent each year until 
at least 2050.”91
In 2007, Oregon’s legislature enacted House Bill 3543, which found 
that climate change is a threat to Oregon’s economy, public health, natu-
ral resources, and environment; adopted GHG reduction goals; and created 
the Oregon Global Warming Commission, whose responsibility is to create 
goals and methods for local and state governments, businesses, residents, and 
nonprofit organizations to decrease GHG emissions. Plaintiffs allege that the 
GHG emissions goals established in House Bill 3545 are inadequate and, even 
if they are adequate, Oregon has failed to meet these goals. The state filed a 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the court granted 
the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded and instructed the 
lower court to determine whether the natural resources identified by plaintiffs 
are trust resources and whether “‘the State of Oregon, as trustee, has a fiduciary 
obligation to protect . . . from the impacts of climate change.’”92 
In discussing the public trust doctrine, the court stated that “the States 
retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over navi-
gable waters. . . . Therefore, the public trust doctrine is a matter of state 
law, subject to the federal power to regulate navigation under the Commerce 
Clause and the admiralty power.”93 
The court agreed with the state’s position that the public trust doctrine 
includes only submerged and submersible lands. Regarding whether the 
atmosphere is encompassed by the public trust doctrine, the “Court first 
questions whether the atmosphere is a ‘natural resource’ at all, much less one 
to which the public trust doctrine applies.”94 The court ultimately decided 
89. Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273, slip op. at 2 (Or. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2–3.
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id. at 8.
94. Id. at 10–11.
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that the atmosphere does not legally fall under Oregon’s public trust doc-
trine. It explained that the state does not hold title to the atmosphere. “[T]he 
public trust doctrine originated when title to the lands beneath navigable 
waters transferred to the State. Unlike submerged and submersible lands . . . 
the State has not been granted title to the atmosphere.”95 To further support 
its decision, the court stated the atmosphere is not “exhaustible and irreplace-
able” and that, although it can be polluted, it is not a “resource that ‘can only 
be spent once.’”96
The court further held that the state has no fiduciary obligation to protect 
resources encompassed in the public trust doctrine. The court reasoned that 
the state’s obligation toward resources protected by the public trust doctrine 
is to prevent the state from alienating these resources, but that there is no 
affirmative fiduciary obligation to protect them. The court also held that the 
relief that the plaintiffs seek violates the separation of powers because ask-
ing the court to order defendants to develop a carbon reduction plan is to 
ask the “Court to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.”97 The 
court reasoned that if it were to grant plaintiffs’ request, it would strike down 
current legislation and impose a more stringent standard for GHG emission 
reductions, thereby replacing the goals established by the legislature.98 The 
plaintiffs filed an appeal in July 2015, which is pending as of this writing.
This recent line of ATL cases at the state level reveals two important 
trends. First, several state courts have embraced the concept of ATL as a 
potential strategy to address climate change regulation in the courts, and it 
is rapidly gaining support. Second, even if the ATL theory does not succeed 
in its own right in the courts, it has already prompted valuable consideration 
or rethinking of how to most effectively goad state governmental entities to 
address climate change regulation initiatives to more effectively safeguard 
the rights of future generations to a safe and healthy environment. For exam-
ple, following up on ATL litigation in the state of Washington that did not 
proceed to the merits, a petition for rulemaking was filed with the Washing-
ton Department of Ecology for climate change regulations. Although the 
Department denied the petition with a detailed response in 2014,99 one year 
later a Washington trial court in Foster v. Washington Department of Ecology 
ordered the Department of Ecology to reconsider its denial of the plaintiffs’ 
95. Id. at 11.
96. Id. at 12.
97. Id. at 15–16.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Letter from State of Washington Department of Ecology, responding to Andrea Rogers Harris’ Petition 
for Rule Making (Aug. 14, 2014), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/
t/576081a01d07c05bf208e7c7/1465942439363/WA.EcologyDecision.pdf.
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petition for rulemaking based on the Department’s December 2014 report 
detailing imminent threats to the state from climate change impacts.100 This 
case is an encouraging development that helps bring ATL closer to compel-
ling climate change regulation as in Massachusetts v. EPA.
C.  Building on ATL and ATL-related Cases in the United States and 
Other Countries
Outside the United States, several lawsuits also have been filed in foreign 
domestic courts applying ATL litigation reasoning. For example, an ATL 
case was filed in 2011 in Ukraine seeking to compel the government to 
address its inactivity in implementing climate protection policies. The 
court ordered the Cabinet to prepare an assessment of the country’s prog-
ress toward realizing the goals of the Kyoto Protocol, which secured an 
important victory for the plaintiffs.101 Similarly, in Uganda, an environ-
mental NGO filed an ATL case against the government invoking a public 
trust duty under the Uganda Constitution to protect the country’s atmo-
spheric resources from climate change.102 Finally, in the Netherlands, 886 
citizens served a summons to hold the government responsible for failing 
to take measures to prevent climate change. The summons requested the 
court to compel the government to fulfill its obligations under Dutch law, 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.103 The citizens prevailed and the 
case is on appeal as of this writing.104
100. Foster v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA (King County Sup. Ct., June 23, 2015), 
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/Order_Fosterv.Ecology.pdf. See also Press Release, Our 
Children’s Trust et al., Washington State Youth Win Unprecedented Decision in Their Climate Change 
Lawsuit (June 24, 2014), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/15.06.24WADecisionPR.pdf.
101. See Our Children’s Trust, Global Legal Actions (Ukraine), http://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/ukraine. 
102. Id. The case is in mediation as of this writing.
103. See RB-Den Haag [Hague District Court] 24 Juni 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (Stichting 
Urgenda/Nederlanden) [Urgenda Found. v. Netherlands], http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziend
ocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145 (last visited Aug. 23, 2016), translated at http://www.
urgenda.nl/documents/VerdictDistrictCourt-UrgendavStaat-24.06.2015.pdf. 
104. For a full analysis of the Urgenda case, see Chapter 21 in this volume. Under a similar “protection 
of future generations” climate justice theory, a lawsuit is being prepared as of this writing against 
Norwegian authorities regarding recently opened blocks of oil and gas exploration acreage in Arctic 
waters. Atle Staalesen, Lawyers Sue State Over Arctic Oil Drilling, The Indep. Barents Observer, Jan. 
18, 2016, http://thebarentsobserver.com/ecology/2016/01/lawyers-sue-state-over-arctic-oil-drilling; 
Aleksander Melli et al., Norway’s Rush to Extract Arctic Oil Contradicts Its Constitution, Truthout, Oct. 
24, 2015, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33324-norway-s-rush-to-extract-arctic-oil-contradicts-
its-constitution. If the government leases these blocks to oil and gas developers, a suit will be filed 
to prevent Arctic drilling under the Norwegian Constitution. Emily J. Gertz, Shell May Be Leaving 
the Arctic, but Norway’s High North Is Open for Business, TakePart, Oct. 6, 2015. Article 112 of the 
Norwegian Constitution requires the government to impose policies that guarantee Norwegian citizens 
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The climate justice and intergenerational equity principles underlying 
ATL litigation also remain viable in ATL-related environmental human 
rights litigation in the United States and abroad. For example, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth105 addressed 
key provisions of a Pennsylvania statute, Act 13, which authorized hydraulic 
fracturing (“fracking”) operations to proceed with virtually no restrictions, 
even in residential areas. In striking down these provisions of Act 13, the 
court relied on the Environmental Rights Amendment in the Pennsylvania 
statute,106 which mandates the conservation and maintenance of the envi-
ronment in Pennsylvania.
The court focused on the environmental rights and public trust angle of 
the issue in resolving the case. The court reasoned that: 
[T]his dispute centers upon an asserted vindication of citizens’ rights to qual-
ity of life on their properties and in their hometowns, insofar as Act 13 threat-
ens degradation of air and water, and of natural, scenic, and esthetic values 
of the environment, with attendant effects on health, safety, and the owners’ 
continued enjoyment of their private property. The citizens’ interests, as a 
result, implicate primarily rights and obligations under the Environmental 
Rights Amendment—Article I, Section 27.107  
In its analysis of the Environmental Rights Amendment, the court noted 
that §27 establishes two separate rights in the people of the commonwealth. 
The first is the declared “right of citizens to clean air and pure water, and 
to the preservation of natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the 
environment.”108 Section 27 also separately requires the preservation of “nat-
ural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.”109 By calling 
for the “preservation” of these broad environmental values, the Constitu-
tion again protects the people from governmental action that unreasonably 
and their descendants the right to a secure climate. Melli et al., supra. The lawyers preparing to bring 
suit assert that in drilling for oil in the Arctic, the government is violating the nation’s constitutional 
requirement to avoid harming the planet for future generations. Hannah Hoag, Executive Summary 
for January 19, Arctic Deeply, Jan. 19, 2016, http://www.arcticdeeply.org/articles/2016/01/8334/
arctic-deeply-executive-summary-january-19/.
105. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564 (Pa. 2013).
106. As stated in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth: 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, 
historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are 
the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of 
these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all 
the people. 
 Id. at 584–85.
107. Id. at 631.
108. Id. at 646.
109. Id. at 642.
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causes actual or likely deterioration of these features.110 Therefore, any regu-
lation is “subordinate to the enjoyment of the right . . . [and] must be regula-
tion purely, not destruction”; laws of the commonwealth that unreasonably 
impair the right are unconstitutional.111
The court further observed that the second right that §27 protects is the 
common ownership of the people, including future generations, of Pennsyl-
vania’s public natural resources.112 The court defined “natural resources” as 
including not only state-owned lands, waterways, and mineral reserves, but 
also resources that implicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface 
and groundwater, wild flora, and fauna (including fish) that are outside the 
scope of purely private property.113
The court determined that the third clause of §27 establishes the com-
monwealth’s duties with respect to Pennsylvania’s commonly owned public 
natural resources.114 It noted that “the Public Trust is an affirmation of the 
duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, 
marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare 
cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes 
of the trust.”115 As trustee of the public trust, the commonwealth has two 
responsibilities: (1) to refrain from performing its trustee duties respecting 
the environment unreasonably, including via legislative enactments or execu-
tive action,116 and (2) to act affirmatively to protect the environment, via 
legislative action.117 Although not an ATL decision, the court’s powerful rea-
soning in Robinson Township fully embraces the extension of the public trust 
doctrine to contexts beyond the traditional scope of the doctrine’s coverage, 
including atmospheric resources.
Similarly, the intergenerational equity principles inherent in ATL are evi-
dent in a recent case in the Philippines. A petition was filed in the Supreme 
Court in Manila on behalf of youth and the 98% of the population without 
cars.118 The petition is in the form of a legal instrument known as a Writ of 
Kalikasan, which provides a remedy for citizens whose environmental rights 
110. Id.
111. Id. at 646.
112. Id. at 651.
113. Id. at 651–52. 
114. Id. at 653.
115. Id. at 654.
116. Id. at 656.
117. Id. at 657.
118. Elyse Wynn Go, Share the Road: Citizens’ Group Seeks Writ of Kalikasan for Clean Air, Equi-
table Road Space, InterAksyon, Feb. 14, 2014, http://www.interaksyon.com/article/80765/
share-the-road--citizens-group-seeks-writ-of-kalikasan-for-clean-air-equitable-road-space.
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have been violated.119 The petition demands that one-half of the roads be 
set aside for citizens who do not drive.120 Like the Robinson Township case, 
the theory in this case also offers support for the reasoning underlying ATL 
litigation in seeking to compel the government to manage resources beyond 
the traditional scope of the public trust doctrine for the benefit of future 
generations.
D.  Prospects for the Future of ATL Litigation
Within the past five years, ATL has been a primary focus of climate justice 
litigation and it has made significant progress in advancing its theory in 
U.S. and foreign domestic courts. This progress notwithstanding, ATL has 
faced significant resistance in state and federal courts in the United States, 
culminating in the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Alec L. v. McCarthy.121 
This section of the analysis discusses reasons for hope and concern based 
on recent developments and the status of ATL as a tool to promote climate 
justice. 
First, the cursory and rigid reasoning in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Alec 
L. v. McCarthy is rooted in the tenuous foundation of the court’s reliance on 
PPL Montana v. Montana.122 The court relied on this case for the proposition 
that the public trust doctrine is a state law doctrine; however, PPL Montana 
v. Montana was not primarily a public trust doctrine analysis. The issue in 
this case was whether, under the equal footing doctrine, segments of rivers 
in Montana are non-navigable to determine if the state of Montana acquired 
title to the rivers.123 The state alleged that it had acquired title to the dis-
puted rivers under the equal footing doctrine on the basis that the rivers are 
navigable.124 Consequently, the state sought rent from the plaintiff, a power 
company, for its use of the riverbeds for hydroelectric production of power.125 
119. Id.
120. Id. In January 2016, the Congress of the Philippines allocated more than 85 million pesos to the Met-
ropolitan Manila Development Authority “for transport and traffic management services particularly 
for road-sharing activities.” See Joyce Ilias, Road-sharing Scheme Along Major Roads in 2016, CNN 
Philippines, Jan. 12, 2016, http://cnnphilippines.com/videos/2016/01/12/Road-sharing-scheme-
along-major-roads-in-2016.html.
121. In addition, some recent scholarly writings have been critical of ATL. See, e.g., Andrew Ballentine, 
Full of Hot Air: Why the Atmospheric Trust Litigation Theory Is an Unworkable Attempt to Expand the 
Public Trust Doctrine Beyond Its Common Law Foundations, 12 Dartmouth L.J. 98 (2014); Caroline 
Cress, It’s Time to Let Go: Why the Atmospheric Trust Won’t Help the World Breathe Easier, 92 N.C. L. 
Rev. 236 (2013).
122. PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012).
123. Id. at 1222. 
124. Id.
125. Id. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the state for 
three reasons: (1) the trial court’s failure to carefully consider the issue of nav-
igability and required overland portage; (2) the reliance on recreational use to 
determine the navigability of the Madison River; and (3) the liberal interpre-
tation of the navigability test.126 The public trust doctrine only entered into 
the Court’s analysis in a peripheral manner. The state alleged that denying 
title would undermine the public trust doctrine.127 The Court simply made 
the distinction that the equal footing doctrine is based on federal constitu-
tional foundations and the public trust doctrine is a matter of state law.128 
Thus, under the equal footing doctrine, federal law determines title to the 
riverbeds, but states retain the power to define the scope of the public trust 
of those waters.129 
It is unfortunate that such an important legal question regarding whether 
ATL can be applied at the federal level was summarily dismissed through 
the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on PPL Montana v. Montana. This case merely 
states a truism regarding the public trust doctrine, does not involve mean-
ingful public trust doctrine analysis, and is not responsive to the legal ques-
tion presented in the Alec L. case. It is certainly true, as a general principle, 
that the public trust doctrine has been considered a matter of state law. But 
the D.C. Circuit merely relied on that general principle without analysis of 
the question presented in Alec L., which was whether this state law doctrine 
can be applied at the federal level under the appropriate circumstances. The 
D.C. Circuit’s unresponsive evasion of the core question in the case is unlike 
previous public trust cases where state courts, presented with the question of 
whether the public trust doctrine can be extended to apply beyond its tra-
ditional water-based uses, did not respond merely by stating that the public 
trust doctrine had been tied to the traditional triad of uses and providing 
no further analysis. Unlike the D.C. Circuit’s stunted analysis in Alec L., 
state courts in the past fortunately were responsive to questions regarding 
the scope of the public trust doctrine’s applicability and, for that reason, 
the doctrine now is understood to extend beyond the traditional triad of 
uses. Climate change is such a politicized issue in the United States that 
the D.C. Circuit simply may have been looking for a way to justify keeping 
climate change claims out of the court system. A related factual context that 
does not involve climate change could easily have yielded a different result in 
126. Id. at 1226. 
127. Id. at 1234. 
128. Id. at 1235. 
129. Id. 
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Alec L., or at least a result that would have generated more significant legal 
reasoning.130
The door to federal ATL relief appeared to be completely shut after the 
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Alec L. and the subsequent denial of writ of certio-
rari in the case.131 However, that door appears to have cracked open in a sub-
sequent federal ATL case, which is pending before the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Oregon as of this writing. In Juliana v. United States, 
the plaintiffs asserted a claim based on ATL theory applicable to the federal 
government coupled with an alleged constitutional law duty regarding due 
process concerns of youth and future generations.132 The court characterized 
the plaintiffs’ creative claims as based on “a novel theory somewhere between 
a civil rights action and [National Environmental Policy Act]/Clean Air Act/
Clean Water Act suit to force the government to take action to reduce harm-
ful pollution.”133 In concluding that the plaintiffs’ claims survived the federal 
government’s motion to dismiss, the court offered compelling reasoning on 
standing, the political question doctrine, and the scope of the public trust 
doctrine that bodes well for the future of ATL litigation.
Regarding standing, the court concluded that the injury element was met. 
Although the personal harms alleged are a consequence of broader harms, 
the court determined “that does not discount the concrete harms already 
suffered by individual plaintiffs or likely to be suffered by these plaintiffs.”134 
Furthermore, “[g]iven the allegations of direct or threatened direct harm, 
albeit shared by most of the population or future population, the court should 
be loath to decline standing to persons suffering an alleged concrete injury of 
130. Two cases outside of the climate change context are relevant to support the plaintiffs’ argument. The 
first case, In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980), involved claims filed by both 
the commonwealth of Virginia and the U.S. government against the defendant for damage to migra-
tory waterfowl, statutory penalties, and cleanup costs arising from an oil spill in the Chesapeake Bay. 
Approximately 30,000 migratory birds allegedly were destroyed as a result of the oil spill. The sole 
issue before the court was whether the commonwealth and/or the federal government had a right to 
sue for the loss of migratory waterfowl. The court concluded that under the public trust doctrine, the 
state of Virginia, and the United States have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public’s 
interest in natural wildlife resources. Id. at 40. Similarly, the court in United States v. Burlington N. 
R.R., 710 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Neb. 1989), noted that the public trust doctrine has been applied to the 
federal government. The court reasoned that although the public trust doctrine traditionally applied 
to tidal waters and the land submerged beneath them, the concept of the United States holding its 
land in trust for the general population is well established in U.S. jurisprudence. Id. at 1287.
131. Alec L. v. McCarthy, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014).
132. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-1517-TC, slip op. at 3 (D. Or. Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.lawa-
ndenvironment.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/04/5456019-0-10918.pdf. On September 13, 
2016, Judge Aiken heard arguments on the federal government’s motion to overturn U.S. Magistrate 
Judge Coffin’s April 8, 2016, order denying the federal government’s motion to dismiss the case. A 
decision is expected in November 2016 to determine whether the Juliana case can proceed to trial.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 6.
Copyright © 2016 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC.
564 Climate Justice
a constitutional magnitude.”135 The court also concluded that there was suf-
ficient causation between the defendants’ actions and the plaintiffs’ harms to 
allow the case to go forward136 because “the failure to regulate the emissions 
has resulted in a danger of constitutional proportions to the public health.”137 
Finally, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ claim is redressable. The 
plaintiffs allege that a court order requiring the government to take action to 
reduce GHG emissions will have an impact on the constitutional harms they 
will suffer if the court does nothing.138 The court held that there is a need for 
expert opinion and therefore the issue is better addressed at a later stage and 
will therefore not be a basis for dismissal.139 The court relied on the Urgenda 
decision in the Netherlands to support its position on redressability.140
The Juliana court also provided powerful reasoning under the political 
question doctrine and the public trust doctrine to support ATL theory. On 
the political question doctrine, the court concluded that although “courts 
cannot intervene to assert ‘better’ policy . . . they can address constitutional 
violations by government agencies and provide equitable relief.”141 The plain-
tiffs allege that government action and inaction violates the Constitution, 
which is an issue that is within the courts’ capacity to adjudicate.142 While 
the court may not have the power to dictate regulations, it can “direct the 
EPA to adopt standards that prevent the alleged constitutional harms to 
youth and future generation plaintiffs.”143
Regarding the scope of the public trust doctrine, the court determined 
that this case is distinguishable from PPL Montana v. Montana. The issue 
of whether the United States “has public trust obligations for waters over 
which it alone has sovereignty” was not presented or decided by the Court in 
PPL Montana.144 This case, conversely, “does not at all implicate the equal 
footing doctrine or public trust obligations in the State of Oregon.”145 Here, 
the public trust doctrine is directed against the United States and its sov-
ereign interests over the oceans and atmosphere of the nation.146 The court 
stated that PPL Montana does not foreclose the “argument that the public 
135. Id. at 7.
136. Id. at 9–10.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 12.
139. Id. at 12.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id. at 13.
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id. at 14.
144. Id. at 18–20.
145. Id. at 20.
146. Id.
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trust doctrine applies to the federal government” and that coastal seawaters 
could not “be privatized without implicating the principles that reflect core 
values of our Constitution and the very essence of the purpose of our nation’s 
government.”147 EPA has a duty to protect the public health from pollut-
ants in the atmosphere and the government’s public trust duties are “deeply 
ingrained in this country’s history” and therefore, the allegations in the com-
plaint state a substantive due process claim.148 The court concluded that it 
“cannot say that the public trust doctrine does not provide at least some 
substantive due process protections for some plaintiffs within the navigable 
water areas of Oregon.”149
Additional support for the proposition that public trust doctrine principles 
apply to the federal government can be found in jurisprudence from other 
nations. For example, courts in the Philippines and India have concluded 
that the federal government has a trust responsibility to protect resources for 
the benefit of all of the people. In Oposa v. Factoran,150 a group of Filipino 
minors represented by their parents sued the secretary of the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for contracting to have large 
portions of the country’s forested area logged. The court concluded that the 
right of the plaintiffs (and all those they represent) to a balanced and health-
ful ecology was as clear as the defendant’s duty to protect and advance this 
right, and the denial or violation of that right gives rise to a cause of action.151 
Similarly, in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, the Supreme Court of India held 
that the public trust doctrine is embedded in the nation’s jurisprudence.152 
The Court determined that “the State is a trustee of all natural resources, 
which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment.”153 It further stated 
that the public at large is the beneficiary for these natural resources and the 
State owes a legal duty to the public to protect the natural resources.154
147. Id. at 23.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (1993).
151. See id.
152. M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Ors, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388, para. 39 (1996).
153. Id. para. 34.
154. Id. Another initiative to help protect future generations from the effects of climate change was adopted 
in Wales in 2015. The first law of its kind in the world, the Well-being of Future Generations Act 
requires public bodies in Wales to consider sustainable development in all of their decisions to ensure 
that the needs of present and future generations will be met. See Jessica Shankleman, Government 
Passes “Groundbreaking” Law to Protect Future Generations From Climate Change, BusinessGreen, 
Mar. 18, 2015, http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2400206/wales-passes-groundbreaking-
law-to-protect-future-generations-from-climate-change. The law requires Public Services Boards to 
prepare a local well-being plan setting out local objectives and steps it proposes to take to meet those 
objectives, including a report containing an assessment of the risks for the United Kingdom of the 
current and predicted impacts of climate change under the Climate Change Act 2008. See Act para. 
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The success of ATL should be gauged not by how many victories are 
achieved in state and federal courts under this theory. Rather, ATL’s success 
ultimately should be judged on the basis of the role it played in facilitat-
ing state and federal government actors in the United States and abroad to 
establish and enforce rights and remedies for climate justice. One only needs 
to look back a few decades to observe similar successes secured through the 
environmental common law in the United States. Such efforts ultimately 
achieved effective federal legislative responses and significant damage awards 
in the contexts of tobacco, lead paint, and asbestos litigation.155 Climate jus-
tice litigation in the United States is currently in the trenches of that struggle, 
but similar success in this context is on the horizon.
In addition, paralleling the evolution of ATL, scholars and leading NGOs 
have been active in international and foreign domestic arenas in seeking 
to promote climate justice from a variety of perspectives. Many of these 
approaches seek to advance the core goal of ATL and focus on how to lever-
age the rights of future generations in shaping a future climate justice regime. 
Some scholarly proposals offer solutions that would need to be crafted within 
the existing international climate change treaty system,156 while others find 
more hope for climate justice outside of that system.157 Regardless of the 
method ultimately employed to secure these goals, what is most important is 
that there is active dialogue and political will throughout the international 
community to promote climate justice as soon and as effectively as possible. 
These developments will help move ATL forward.158
24. The law also establishes the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales “to act as a guardian 
for the interests of future generations in Wales, and to support the public bodies listed in the Act 
to work towards achieving the well-being goals of the Act.” Department for Natural Resources 
of the Welsh Government, Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act of 2015: The 
Essentials 9 (2015), http://gov.wales/docs/dsjlg/publications/150623-guide-to-the-fg-act-en.pdf.
155. Similar to the ATL context, the use of the environmental common law to seek relief in these contexts 
also has been criticized by scholars. See, e.g., Richard O. Faulk & S. John Gray, Getting the Lead Out? 
The Misuse of Public Nuisance Litigation by Public Authorities and Private Counsel, 21 Toxics L. Rep. 
1172, 1176 (2006).
156. See generally Peter Lawrence, Justice for Future Generations: Climate Change and Interna-
tional Law (2014) (evaluating why and how climate justice principles should be incorporated into 
international climate change treaty law rules).
157. See generally Teresa M. Thorp, Climate Justice: A Voice for the Future (2014) (proposing to 
constitutionalize universally applicable principles and legal norms of international climate change 
law by drawing on a coalition of public, private, and civil society leadership).
158. A burgeoning body of ATL scholarship has emerged within the past few years, which has helped 
advance the theory as it progresses through the courts and legislatures in the United States and abroad. 
See generally Ken Coghill & Tim Smith eds., Fiduciary Duty and the Atmospheric Trust 
(2013); Richard J. Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, Legislative Dysfunction, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Can 
Two Wrongs Make It Right?, 45 Envtl. L. 1139 (2015); Tim Kline, Alec L. and Federal Atmospheric 
Trust Litigation: Conceptual and Political Gains Amidst Legal Defeat?, 42 Ecology L.Q. 549 (2015); 
Kassandra Castillo, Climate Change & The Public Trust Doctrine: An Analysis of Atmospheric Trust 
Litigation, 6 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 221 (2015); Kylie Wha Kyung Wager, In Common 
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The growth of ATL is due in part to the helpful synergy it enjoys with 
the climate change and human rights movement at the international level 
that began in the wake of the Inuit petition one decade ago and has gained 
significant momentum since that time. Within the past several years, numer-
ous international conferences, studies, and reports have continued to address 
the interplay between climate change and human rights. The United Nations 
Human Rights Council also has weighed in on the issue.159 A recent exam-
ple of the international attention that climate change and human rights has 
received is a major report prepared by the International Bar Association Task 
Force on Climate Change Justice and Human Rights.160 Released on Sep-
tember 22, 2014, the 240-page report proposes more than 50 recommen-
dations to promote climate justice responses to protect environmental and 
human rights. Among the recommendations are proposed legal recognition 
for a new universal human right to a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable 
environment and establishment of  a new international dispute resolution 
framework for climate change issues, including a new International Court 
on the Environment.161 Increasing international recognition of the need to 
engage dispute resolution frameworks to promote climate justice will help 
ATL achieve its objectives.
Within the U.S. court system, a promising development is unfolding at 
the state level in the wake of the federal displacement holdings in AEP and 
Kivalina. The Clean Air Act federal displacement rationale only applies to 
federal common law claims—the Court in AEP expressly left the door open 
for state common law claims seeking damages.162 A 2014 decision by the 
Iowa Supreme Court163 upheld plaintiffs’ rights to seek damages from air 
pollution in a state common law tort action. Relying on savings clause analy-
sis rooted in the U.S. Supreme Court’s preemption analysis in International 
Paper Co. v. Ouelette,164 the Iowa Supreme Court “rejected the defendants’ 
arguments that the [Clean Air Act] displaced or otherwise preempted state 
common law nuisance, trespass, and other tort claims for property damage 
Law We Trust: How Hawai’i’s Public Trust Doctrine Can Support Atmospheric Trust Litigation to Address 
Climate Change, 20 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 55 (2014); Jordan M. Ellis, The Sky’s 
the Limit: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to the Atmosphere, 86 Temp. L. Rev. 807 (2014). 
159. See, e.g., Human Rights and Climate Change, U.N. Human Rights Council, Res. 7/23 (2008), http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_7_23.pdf. 
160. International Bar Association, Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate 
Disruption, supra note 6.
161. Id.
162. See Hester, supra note 22, at 52 (citing American Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 
(2011)).
163. Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., No. 13-0723 (Iowa June 13, 2014).
164. International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
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and harms to human health” caused by air pollution.165 Similarly encourag-
ing, the Court relied on the Second Circuit’s reasoning in AEP to underscore 
that “courts have successfully adjudicated complex common law public nui-
sance claims for more than a century”166 and rejected the defendant’s effort 
to dismiss as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine a common 
law tort claim for air pollution damages. Therefore, this case (and ones that 
are likely to follow in the near future) that supports the capacity of state 
courts to adjudicate damage claims for air pollution will provide a helpful 
foundation for future ATL efforts. As state courts continue to depart from 
the principle that “damages from atmospheric sources are beyond the courts’ 
capacity to address because the Clean Air Act addresses them,” a door will 
remain open to enhance the opportunity for ATL claims to be successfully 
adjudicated at the state court level. 
Conclusion
Although courts are not the best avenue to pursue effective and compre-
hensive regulation of climate change, the common law can be a powerful 
mechanism to goad proper regulatory responses to climate change impacts. 
The climate justice movement in the United States recently has shifted its 
jurisprudential reliance to another effective common law tool, atmospheric 
trust litigation. ATL involves a creative expansion of the public trust doc-
trine in suits primarily against state governments alleging that the state has 
a duty to manage its atmospheric resources to protect the interests of future 
generations. 
Although extending the public trust doctrine to the federal government is 
supported by U.S. and foreign domestic jurisprudence, it is nonetheless pos-
sible that ATL plaintiffs may not be able to secure an opportunity to be heard 
before the U.S. Supreme Court and prevail on the merits of their claim to 
compel the federal government to regulate climate change. Notwithstanding 
this potential roadblock for ATL litigation, some recent ATL and non-ATL 
decisions in the United States and abroad offer hope that this common law 
theory will help promote climate justice within and outside the court system. 
Moreover, the growth of dialogue and responses in the international com-
munity and in foreign domestic arenas regarding climate change and human 
rights will enhance the receptivity of the judicial audience in evaluating ATL 
claims in the years ahead. 
165. Howard A. Learner, Emerging Clarity on Climate Change Law: EPA Empowered and State Common 
Law Remedies Enabled, 44 ELR 10744, 10749 (2015).
166. Freeman, No. 13-0723, at 62.
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The ultimate goal of ATL is to ensure that the federal government will 
regulate climate change, which, in turn, will help protect current and future 
victims of climate change impacts. The slow progression toward regulating 
climate change is already underway in the United States. Moreover, thanks 
to the power of the environmental common law as reflected in the climate 
justice litigation in the past decade, there will be significant progress toward 
this goal in the years ahead as ATL cases continue to achieve success in com-
municating the urgency of this need for federal regulation.
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